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DOES TITLE VII WORK FOR TEMPS? FAUSH v. TUESDAY MORNING
RECONSIDERS THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
SHANE O’HALLORAN*
“And you have all these people say, ‘When are you going to get a real
job?’  I mean, you’re going through all the motions of a real job.  I
mean, you’re showing up at a place between eight and five.  And
technically, you’re probably doing as much as anyone else who works
there full-time.  You know?  But you’re just sort of this ghost.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: EVERYBODY’S WORKING FOR THE WEEKEND—EXCEPT
TEMPORARY WORKERS
Matthew Faush was an African-American employed by Labor Ready, a
national temporary staffing company.2  Faush alleged that, while assigned
to closeout store Tuesday Morning, Inc. (Tuesday Morning), white em-
ployees and managers subjected him to racial discrimination that ulti-
mately resulted in his termination.3  Faush sought a legal remedy for this
alleged injustice.4  However, Faush found the halls of justice closed when
the court determined that, because Faush was a temporary worker, he was
not an employee of Tuesday Morning for purposes of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).5  Rather, Faush, like other temporary work-
ers who have sought to bring Title VII claims against their temporarily-
assigned placement employers, was deemed an employee only of the staff-
ing company.6
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2010, Oberlin College.  Thank you to my family for supporting me, Adriana
for putting up with me, my friends for pushing me, and everyone whose hard work
contributed to this Casebrief.
1. KEVIN D. HENSON, JUST A TEMP 1 (1996).
2. See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 350, 352 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (recounting factual posture of Faush’s claim), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
remanded by 808 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2015).
3. See id. (describing Faush’s contentions regarding treatment by Tuesday
Morning employees).
4. See id. (describing Faush’s claims under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964
and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act).
5. See id. at 355 (holding Faush “was not an employee of Tuesday Morning”
under Title VII or Pennsylvania Human Relations Act).  To determine whether
Faush was an employee, the trial court applied the analysis announced by the Su-
preme Court in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden. See id. (applying Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–24 (1992)).  Finding that no
employment relationship existed, the district court granted summary judgment for
Tuesday Morning on Faush’s Title VII and PHRA claims. See id. at 356.
6. See id. at 355 (discussing facts indicative of employment relationship be-
tween Faush and Labor Ready).  The trial court focused on Labor Ready’s role in
assigning Faush to work at Tuesday Morning; providing him with a timecard; set-
(653)
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The use of temporary employees has grown significantly over the past
several decades, raising new questions about statutory liability under fed-
eral employment laws for employers using temporary staffing services.7
For example, studies from the Department of Labor (DOL) show that “be-
tween ten and thirty percent” of employers studied “misclassified [their]
employees as independent contractors,” and this incorrect classification
impacts employers’ statutory liability and results in underreported wages
and unemployment compensation tax liability.8  Meanwhile, the Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC) and some courts have
sought to expand the legal obligations of employers toward temporary
workers, and some observers have predicted that, given Title VII’s reme-
dial policy purpose, courts are likely to construe the definition of em-
ployee more expansively than in the past.9
ting his pay rate and paying wages, taxes, and insurance; and not permitting him to
be on Tuesday Morning’s premises unattended. See id.
7. See Pamela Villarreal & Peter Swanson, Temporary Employment: The New Per-
manent?, NAT’L CENTER FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.ncpa.org/
pub/ba754 [https://perma.cc/9NPB-WK9K] (describing increase in percentage
of labor force made up by temporary employees from less than one percent in
early 1970s to three percent by 2000).  Outside of the Title VII context, Third
Circuit courts have found that temporary workers may qualify as joint employees of
both the assigning agency and the recipient of services for purposes of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012); see also Lindsay
Kreppel, The Third Circuit Enunciates a New Test for Determining Joint Employers Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act in In Re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Employment
Practices Litigation: A Look into Its Potential Impact on Business Management and the
Need to Further Recognize FLSA’s Legislative Intent, 15 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 243, 245 (2013)
(discussing In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d
462 (3d Cir. 2012)) (describing Third Circuit case law holding two or more enti-
ties may be considered joint employers under FLSA if both exert significant con-
trol over worker).
8. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An
Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland Between an Employer-
and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 613 n.25 (2012) (discussing anal-
ysis of incorrect characterizations of employees by employers).  As Rubinstein
points out,
[T]here is no clear understanding about how the law should distinguish
between employees and non-employees whether they are characterized as
volunteers, independent contractors, or shareholders.  This lack of clarity
is largely due to the fact that the statutory language defining employee
status in virtually all of our nation’s employment laws is vague, con-
clusory, and largely useless . . . .  This is not helpful for anyone.  Both
employees and employers need to be able to determine what rights they
do or do not have.  When employment status is unclear, employment
rights are unclear.  Uncertainty can become a breeding ground for
litigation.
Id. at 608–09 (footnotes omitted).
9. See Charles G. Meyer, III & A. Tevis Marshall, The Temptation of Hiring
Temps: Potential Liability for Employers, 17 No. 1 VA. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (2005) (noting
courts may seek to expand employer liability given remedial policy considerations
behind Title VII).  Meyer and Marshall note that some jurisdictions have expanded
Title VII liability to include temporary workers “when the employers retained suffi-
2
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Third Circuit courts have consistently analyzed temporary workers’ Ti-
tle VII claims under the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,10 which considers the hiring party’s right
to control the manner and means by which the worker accomplishes the
work or creates the product.11  Those cases focused largely on formal pay-
ment procedures and hiring and firing authority, and did not consider the
possibility that a temporary worker may qualify as a joint employee of both
employers at common law.12
The relevant case law yielded consistent results: the Third Circuit
found temporary workers were employees only of the staffing agencies,
not the agencies’ clients.13  However, in reviewing Faush’s claims, the
Third Circuit reaffirmed the applicability of Darden to Title VII claims but,
for the first time, held that a temporary worker may survive summary judg-
ment as to the issue of whether an employment relationship existed with
an assigned temporary placement employer.14
This Casebrief discusses the Third Circuit’s evolving approach to tem-
porary workers and Title VII and explains that more temporary workers
will survive summary judgment after Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc.15  The
Faush court’s explicit recognition of joint-employer liability, increased em-
cient control over the means and manner of a temporary worker’s performance.”
See id.
10. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
11. See id. at 323 (describing focus of common law employment test); Scott v.
UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Civil Action No. 10–929–RGA, 2012 WL 2016820, at
*1 (D. Del. June 5, 2012), aff’d, 523 F. App’x 911 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying Darden
to conclude temporary worker was not employee of assigned work placement);
Prather v. Prudential Fox & Roach, 326 F. App’x 670, 672 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming
conclusion that temporary worker was not employee); Shah v. Bank of Am., 598 F.
Supp. 2d 596, 602 (D. Del. 2009), aff’d, 346 F. App’x 831 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying
Darden test in holding temporary worker was not employee).  While these were
unpublished decisions aside from Shah, they represent all instances of Third Cir-
cuit courts considering the issue at hand. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 212 n.1 (“The
District Court, in the absence of precedential authority within this Circuit, under-
standably relied on non-precedential opinions in reaching its conclusion.”).
12. See Scott, 523 F. App’x at 912 (omitting discussion of joint employment
while focusing on payment procedures and hiring and firing authority); Prather,
326 F. App’x at 672 (same); Shah, 346 F. App’x at 833 (same).
13. See Scott, 523 F. App’x at 912–13 (holding temporary worker at UPS facility
not eligible for Title VII protection); Prather, 326 F. App’x at 671–72 (deeming
“temporary administrative aide” in real estate office ineligible for Title VII protec-
tion); Shah, 346 F. App’x at 833–34 (affirming finding that temporary bank worker
was ineligible for Title VII protection).
14. See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 220 (3d Cir. 2015)
(holding reasonable jury could find Faush was employee of Tuesday Morning and
reversing grant of summary judgment).  In Faush, the court noted the “absence of
precedential authority” discussing this issue, but noted that the previous cases “in-
volved pro se plaintiffs who presented virtually no evidence in opposition to sum-
mary judgment and thus are readily distinguishable,” thus signaling the possibility
that a temporary employee-plaintiff may survive summary judgment. See id. 212 n.1
(describing reasoning of district court).
15. 808 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2015).
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phasis on factors relating to day-to-day control, and focus on practical
function over legal form in payment procedures, as well as hiring and fir-
ing authority, suggest this increased likelihood of surviving summary judg-
ment may be particularly true for workers who perform the same unskilled
tasks as full-time employees at fixed hourly rates under direct supervision
of the assigned temporary employer.16
The Faush court’s decision has important consequences for businesses
making use of temporary employees and appears to represent a potential
expansion of liability under Title VII.17  While the Faush decision may sig-
nal an expansion of potential liability for Title VII claims in the Third
Circuit, the holding that employers may be jointly liable comports with the
weight of authority in other jurisdictions and current EEOC guidance.18
Part II of this Casebrief will provide an overview of the substantive
provisions and policy purposes of Title VII.19  Part II will also trace the
development of temporary workers’ eligibility for Title VII protection in
the Third Circuit, as well as that of other circuits and the EEOC’s treat-
ment of the issue.20  Part III will examine the facts, procedural history, and
holding of Faush.21  Part IV will compare the analyses of other jurisdic-
tions, the district court, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, highlight-
ing differences in their respective analytical frameworks and concluding
that Faush appropriately extends liability to some temporary assigned
16. See id. at 215–17 (noting Tuesday Morning’s payments to Labor Ready
were “functionally indistinguishable from direct employee compensation,” Tues-
day Morning managers “directly supervised” Labor Ready workers, those workers
were hired for and “performed only unskilled tasks,” and agreement between
Tuesday Morning and Labor Ready obligated Tuesday Morning to comply with
relevant labor and employment laws).
17. See Susan K. Lessack & Kali T. Wellington-James, Third Circuit Rules That
Temporary Worker Assigned by Staffing Agency Can Bring Race Discrimination Claim
Against Company Where He Was Placed, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Nov. 24, 2015),
www.pepperlaw.com/publications/third-circuit-rules-that-temporary-worker-as-
signed-by-staffing-agency-can-bring-race-discrimination-claim-against-company-
where-he-was-placed-2015-11-24/ [https://perma.cc/H3LF-9XUQ] (opining Faush
should “cause companies to review their relationships with temporary workers, as-
sess the risk of their being viewed as joint employers and, if appropriate, restruc-
ture the relationships to minimize that risk”).
18. See Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir.
2015) (expressly adopting possibility of joint-employer liability under Title VII and
applying hybrid test); Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 611
F. Supp. 344, 347–49 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing joint-employer possibility under
economic realities test and common law loaned servant doctrine in denying mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to allege employment relationship in Title VII claim),
aff’d sub nom. Aharnare v. Merrill Lynch, 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1985); U.S. Equal
Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Notice No. 915.002 (1997), 1997 WL 33159161, at
*5–6.
19. For a discussion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see infra notes
24–35 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of case law and administrative guidance on the applicabil-
ity of Title VII to temporary workers, see infra notes 36–65 and accompanying text.
21. For a detailed explanation of the Third Circuit’s decision in Faush, see
infra notes 66–109 and accompanying text.
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placement employers.22  Finally, Part V will offer brief advice to practition-
ers representing employers and temporary employees following Faush.23
II. BACKGROUND: TEMPORARY WORKERS LEFT WAITING FOR
TITLE VII BONUS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has represented landmark
legislation aimed at eliminating discriminatory employment practices.24
Despite its broad sweep, Title VII’s sparse and circular definition of “em-
ployee” has led to interpretation in the form of both administrative gui-
dance and judicial opinions.25
A. Title VII: Fighting for the Rights of Employees but Failing to Define Who
Qualifies as One
Congress enacted Title VII to ensure equal employment opportuni-
ties by eliminating employment practices and policies that discriminate on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.26  Though the
22. For a critical analysis of the reasoning in Faush, see infra notes 110–28 and
accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of practical advice for practitioners in the wake of Faush,
see infra notes 129–43 and accompanying text.
24. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1–2000e-17 (2012); Damon Ritenhouse, A Primer on
Title VII: Part One, A.B.A. (Jan. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
gpsolo_ereport/2013/january_2013/primer_title_vii_part_one.html [https://per
ma.cc/89ME-GA8U] (introducing Title VII).
25. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (apply-
ing traditional agency law principles to determine who qualifies as employee where
“statute containing that terms fails to helpfully define it”); Frankel v. Bally, Inc.,
987 F.2d 86, 88–89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing various federal anti-discrimination stat-
utes and Supreme Court decisions interpreting term “employer”) (discussing diffi-
culties in defining employer in federal statutes and applying common law agency
test to Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim); U.S. Equal Emp. Opportu-
nity Comm’n Notice No. 915.002 (1997), 1997 WL 33159161, at *1 (discussing
whether temporary workers qualify as employees under Title VII).  That the rele-
vant case law includes cases defining employee in contexts other than Title VII—
such as ERISA and the Americans with Disabilities Act—is irrelevant, as the Darden
court explained that “where a statute containing the word ‘employee’ does not
helpfully define it, the common law agency test should be applied.” See Frankel,
987 F.2d at 90 (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 322).
26. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1–2000e-17; Ritenhouse, supra note 24 (describing
purpose of Title VII).  Congress passed Title VII at a time when racial biases were
overt and often incorporated in official employment policies, with the goal of com-
bating racial discrimination by promoting equal opportunities for all races, espe-
cially African-Americans. See id. (arguing legislative history and final form of Title
VII demonstrate intent to advance employment prospects of African-Americans
and other minorities).  In enacting Title VII, Congress also created the EEOC, “a
five-member bipartisan commission” charged with enforcing the anti-discrimina-
tion laws contained in the Civil Rights Act, which began operating on July 2, 1965.
See EEOC History, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/
[https://perma.cc/7ZYW-JDPB] (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).  Title VII provides that
no more than three of the five commissioners may be members of the same politi-
cal party, and it requires members to be appointed to five-year terms by the Presi-
5
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Supreme Court has characterized Title VII as a “detailed statutory
scheme,” Title VII defines “employee” only as “an individual employed by
an employer,” a definition that many criticize as circular.27  Accordingly,
courts have concluded that Congress intended to describe the common
law agency doctrine’s conception of the master–servant relationship, and
have applied the common law test for that relationship as articulated in
Darden when considering Title VII claims.28
B. Interpreting “Employee”: The Tricks of the Trade
In interpreting Title VII’s definition of employee, courts have applied
the common law test as set forth in Darden to determine the existence of
an employment relationship.29  The Darden test considers a non-exhaus-
tive set of factors, including:
dent and confirmed by the Senate. See id.  The “majority of Title VII claims” are
predicated on claims of disparate treatment. See Ritenhouse, supra note 24.  An
individual may establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII
by showing “that he or she: (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was qualified for
the job; (3) was subjected to adverse employment action; and that (4) the em-
ployer gave better treatment to similarly situated person outside of the protected
class.” See Carla A. Ford, Gender Discrimination and Hostile Work Environment, 57 U.S.
ATT’YS’ BULL. 2 (2009) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
792–93 (1973)) (introducing elements of prima facie case of disparate treatment
under governing McDonnell Douglas framework).  Adverse employment actions may
include: “failure to hire or promote, termination of employment, demotion, sus-
pension, a cut in pay or benefit, reassignment of duties, reassignment to an unde-
sirable position or location, and denial of opportunities for training and
advancement.” See id. (providing examples of adverse actions).  Ford also com-
ments that circuits have interpreted adverse action differently, noting that “[t]he
First, Second, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits take a
more expansive view,” while the “Fifth and Eighth Circuits hold that only ‘ultimate
employment actions’ such as hiring, firing, promoting and demoting constitute
actionable adverse actions.” See id. (citations omitted) (discussing varying jurisdic-
tional interpretations of employment actions).  However, despite the specificity
with which unlawful employment practices under Title VII have been defined in
case law, the statute defines “employee” only as “an individual employed by an
employer.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (setting forth definition of “employee” for
purposes of Title VII); Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 206
(1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)).
27. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (“ERISA’s nominal definition of ‘employee’ as
‘any individual employed by an employer’ is completely circular and explains noth-
ing.” (citation omitted)).  While Darden was concerned with the definition of em-
ployee under ERISA “because Title VII’s definition of ‘employee’ is similarly
devoid of content, the common-law test outlined in Darden governs in the Title VII
context as well.” See Faush, 808 F.3d at 213 (citing Supreme Court and Third Cir-
cuit cases that applied Darden to Title VII claims).
28. For a discussion of courts’ interpretation of employer and employee in
the context of Title VII, see infra notes 29–65 and accompanying text.
29. See Walters, 519 U.S. at 211 (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24) (noting
definition of “employee” as set forth in Darden and describing definition as stem-
ming from “traditional principles of agency law”). Darden involved an ERISA
claim, but courts have subsequently utilized its construction of the terms “em-
ployee” and “employer” in the context of Title VII and other statutes where defini-
tions are devoid of context and content. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 321 (discussing
6
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[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship
between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the
hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the
method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision
of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.30
The analysis requires a fact-based examination of “the level of control
an organization asserts over an individual’s access to employment and the
organization’s power to deny such access,” rather than a bright-line deter-
mination.31  In Faush, the Third Circuit distilled the relevant factors into
three: “which entity paid [the employees’] salaries, hired and fired them,
and had control over their daily employment activities.”32
The Third Circuit has previously recognized the concept of a “joint
employer” under the relevant employment relationship analysis.33  It has
held that a joint-employment relationship exists where “one employer
while contracting in good faith with an otherwise independent company,
has retained for itself sufficient control of the terms and conditions of
employment of the employees who are employed by the other em-
ERISA claim); see also Walters, 519 U.S. at 211–12 (applying Darden in context of
Title VII claim).
30. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (introducing factors relevant in discerning
whether employer–employee relationship exists).  In addition to listing these fac-
tors, the Court stated that, “[i]n determining whether a hired party is an employee
under the general common law of agency, we consider the party’s right to control
the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.” See id. at 323 (dis-
cussing application of common law agency analysis).
31. See Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 728 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Sibley Mem’l
Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F. 2d 1338, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (discussing approach to
determining existence of employment relationship).
32. See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2015) (al-
teration in original) (quoting Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved Basketball Offi-
cials, 710 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2013)) (noting Third Circuit’s focus on three
factors).
33. See id. at 213 (rejecting Enterprise test for joint-employer status in Title VII
actions); see also NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122–24
(3d Cir. 1982) (discussing concept and characteristics of joint employers at com-
mon law).
7
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ployer.”34  Thus, prior Third Circuit decisions recognized the joint-em-
ployment relationship under the common law.35
C. Employment History: Third Circuit Case Law on Temporary Workers and
Title VII
Until Faush, Third Circuit courts consistently found that temporary
workers were not employees of their temporary placements, and the Third
Circuit upheld grants of summary judgment based on the nonexistence of
an employment relationship in several recent cases with similar facts.36
Significantly, in granting summary judgment, district courts assumed that
an employee could have only one employer.37
In Prather v. Prudential Fox & Roach,38 a temporary administrative aide
alleged sexual harassment over the course of her work placement.39  The
plaintiff had worked at a realty company for approximately five months
after being assigned the administrative aide job “through a staffing ser-
vice.”40  The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the realty
company, and the Third Circuit affirmed under Darden, specifically noting
34. See Browning-Ferris, 691 F.2d at 1123 (quoting Walter B. Cooke, Inc., Case
2-CA-16979, slip op. at 31 (N.L.R.B. June 30, 1982)).  In Browning-Ferris, Browning-
Ferris, which “operated a refuse transfer site,” was found to have engaged in unfair
labor practices in firing two drivers jointly employed by both Browning-Ferris and
independently-contracted trucking companies. See id. at 1119 (introducing facts of
case).  The court found that the drivers qualified as joint employees because
Browning-Ferris and the independent contractors “shared . . . the right to hire and
fire the drivers” and set rules of employment, and the operator set schedules and
provided company uniforms to the drivers, despite the drivers being paid by the
independent contractors. See id. at 1124–25 (discussing facts relevant to finding of
joint-employer relationship).
35. See Browning-Ferris, 691 F.2d at 1122–24 (discussing joint-employer rela-
tionship under common law); see also Graves, 117 F.3d at 727 (recognizing possibil-
ity that county and state could be joint-employers of court clerks).
36. See Scott v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 523 F. App’x 911, 912–13 (3d Cir.
2013) (holding temporary UPS worker ineligible for Title VII protection); Prather
v. Prudential Fox & Roach, 326 F. App’x 670, 672 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding tempo-
rary administrative aide at realty company ineligible for Title VII protection); Shah
v. Bank of Am., 346 F. App’x 831, 833 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding temporary bank
worker ineligible for Title VII protection).
37. See Scott, 523 F. App’x at 912 (omitting discussion of joint-employment
relationship in determining temporary “billing and collections” worker was not
employee of shipping, freight, and logistics company); Prather, 326 F. App’x at
672–73 (omitting discussion of joint-employment relationship in determining tem-
porary administrative aide was not employee of real estate company); Shah, 346 F.
App’x at 834 (omitting discussion of joint-employment relationship in determin-
ing temporary bank teller was not employee of bank); Fields v. Colgate Palmolive
Co., Civil Action No. 10–365 (PGS), 2010 WL 5252537, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2010)
(finding temporary chemist not employee of temporary assigned employer without
discussing potential joint-employer relationship).
38. 326 F. App’x 670 (3d. Cir. 2009).
39. See id. at 671–72 (introducing facts of case).
40. See id. (describing plaintiff’s temporary employment).
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that the aide “sent her timesheets to, and received her paycheck directly
from, [the agency],” and contacted them when calling out sick.41
In Shah v. Bank of America,42 a temporary worker “alleged discrimina-
tion based upon race and national-origin” against Bank of America (BOA)
in violation of Title VII and Delaware law.43  After the district court en-
tered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Third Circuit af-
firmed, focusing on the short duration of the temporary employment, as
well as payment and rate-setting procedures.44
The district court also entered summary judgment for the defendant
on similar grounds in Scott v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions.45  In Scott, a tem-
porary worker assigned to UPS Supply Chain Solutions (UPS) by a staffing
service brought a discrimination claim, “on the basis of gender stereotyp-
ing” and “on the basis of his sexual orientation.”46  The worker had been
assigned to UPS “for about ten months.”47  As in Shah and Prather, the trial
court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.48  The Third
41. See id. at 672–73 (holding temporary administrative aide was not employee
under Darden and was therefore ineligible for Title VII protection).  The court also
noted that the staffing service “paid [the aide’s] social security taxes and worker’s
compensation insurance,” and the realty company lacked “the ability to terminate”
the aide. See id. (describing factors weighing against Title VII protection and treat-
ing plaintiff’s listing of service as employer on commission form as non-
dispositive).
42. 346 F. App’x 831 (3d Cir. 2009).
43. See id. at 833 (“Shah then filed suit against BOA in the Superior Court of
Delaware alleging employment discrimination under Title VII . . . . alleg[ing] dis-
crimination based upon race and national origin.” (citations omitted)).  The
worker had already been assigned to work at Bank of America (BOA) temporarily.
See id.  On the worker’s first day of the second temporary assignment, an employee
recognized the worker as having been accused of harassing another employee dur-
ing the previous temporary assignment, and the worker “was escorted out the
building.” See id. (discussing adverse employment action giving rise to allegations).
The employee had accused the temporary worker of harassing her via phone and
by “[driving] by her house on multiple occasions.” See id.
44. See id. at 834 (affirming trial court’s entry of summary judgment).  In sup-
port of its holding, the Third Circuit noted that:
the record demonstrates that Shah worked for BOA for less than four
hours; he continue[d] to receive work assignments through [the staffing
service]; that it is [the staffing service] that assigns his rate of pay; that
BOA contacted [the staffing service] before terminating Shah’s employ-
ment; and that following his termination, he received unemployment
benefits from [the staffing service], not BOA.
Id. (describing Darden factors that weighed against finding employment
relationship).
45. 523 F. App’x 911 (3d Cir. 2013).
46. See id. at 912 (discussing procedural background of case).
47. See id. at 913 (“Scott worked for UPS for about ten months; that he re-
mained employed by Kelly Services after his UPS assignment ended; that Kelly Ser-
vices determined his rate of pay and paid him; and that Kelly Services terminated
his UPS assignment.” (citing Scott v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Civil Action No.
10–929–RGA, 2012 WL 2016820, at *5 (D. Del. June 5, 2012), aff’d, 523 F. App’x
911 (3d Cir. 2013))).
48. See id.
9
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Circuit affirmed based on the Darden factors, focusing on payment proce-
dures and that UPS neither hired nor fired the plaintiff.49
D. Surveying the Job Market: Treatment of Temporary Workers and the Title
VII Employment Relationship in Other Jurisdictions and
Administrative Guidance
Other circuits and administrative guidance have emphasized the con-
trol-related factors of Darden and recognized the possibility of joint-em-
ployer status.50  EEOC guidance from as early as 1997 also supports
temporary workers’ potential status as employees under Title VII.51  Ac-
cording to the EEOC, “[a] client of a temporary employment agency typi-
cally qualifies as an employer of the temporary worker during the job
assignment [for purposes of Title VII] . . . because the client usually exer-
cises significant supervisory control over the worker.”52
In Maynard v. Kenova Chemical Co.,53 a temporary worker brought suit
after being injured at a job site.54  The worker had previously received a
49. See id. (affirming trial court’s entry of summary judgment).  Specifically,
the court noted that the worker “remained employed by [the staffing service] after
his UPS assignment ended; [the staffing service] determined his rate of pay and
paid him; [the staffing service] terminated his UPS assignment.” Id. (applying
Darden factors).  Further, the court noted that “[a]dditionally, [the staffing service]
was in charge of monitoring his daily attendance, vacation, sick leave, and perform-
ance evaluations,” and the worker “did not have employee access to the UPS facil-
ity and had to be admitted by the receptionist every day.”  Id. (listing Darden factors
that weighed against finding employment relationship); see also Fields v. Colgate
Palmolive Co., Civil Action No. 10–365 (PGS), 2010 WL 5252537, at *1 (D.N.J.
Dec. 15, 2010) (granting motion to dismiss on grounds that temporary worker
never had employment relationship with temporary work placement).  In Fields,
the court cited Shah for the proposition that “when [a] [t]emporary [e]mployment
[a]gency assigns an individual to work for an employer, that individual does not
become an employee of the employer.” See id. at *4.
50. See Casey v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 807 F.3d 395, 404–05 (1st
Cir. 2015) (emphasizing “non-exhaustive” list of control-related factors recom-
mended by EEOC); Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 406 (4th Cir.
2015) (describing “hybrid test which considers both the common law of agency
and the economic realities of employment”); Maynard v. Kenova Chem. Co., 626
F.2d 359, 360–61 (4th Cir. 1980) (introducing loaned servant doctrine of joint-
employer liability).  Under the loaned servant doctrine, a worker may become an
employee of his or her temporary employer “while performing [ ] services” for that
temporary employer. See id. at 361.  District courts have also found joint-employer
status. See, e.g., Callicutt v. Pepsi Bottling Grp., Inc., No. CIV. 00-95DWFAJB, 2002
WL 992757, at *7–8 (D. Minn. May 13, 2002) (applying hybrid test); U.S. Equal
Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Notice No. 915.002, infra note 51.
51. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Notice No. 915.002 (1997),
1997 WL 33159161, at *1 (“The guidance makes clear that a staffing firm must hire
and make job assignments in a non-discriminatory manner.  It also makes clear
that the client must treat the staffing firm worker assigned to it in a non-discrimi-
natory manner.”).
52. Id. at *5 (defining “client” in context of temporary employment).
53. 626 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1980).
54. See id. at 360 (discussing facts of case).  The plaintiff “fell from an alleg-
edly defective scaffolding.” See id.  As the Faush court notes, Maynard predates
10
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workman’s compensation award from the staffing company relating to the
same accident but brought his action “against [the temporary assigned
work placement] as a third-party tort-feasor.”55  The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the trial court’s finding that the temporary assigned work place-
ment agency was acting as Maynard’s employer at the time of the accident
under the “loaned servant doctrine,” and because the agency was “a sub-
scriber in good standing with [the state’s] workmen’s compensation
fund,” the plaintiff was precluded from bringing further action in addition
to the worker’s compensation claim.56  In doing so, the Maynard court
recognized the applicability of the joint-employer concept to determine
the existence of a common law employment relationship, anticipating the
EEOC’s 1997 guidance.57
The First Circuit also emphasized control-related factors in examining
the existence of a common law employment relationship in Casey v. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services.58  In Casey, a former employee of a gov-
ernment contractor working at a military facility brought a Title VII action
against the contractor-employer and “several government agencies,” alleg-
ing “gender discrimination in violation of Title VII.”59  The First Circuit
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government agencies based on
the district court’s findings that, although the government agencies “had
oversight responsibility for administration of the program” and set per-
formance criteria, the worker’s direct supervisor at the government con-
tractor directed her day-to-day activities.60  While the Casey court upheld
the finding that the government contractor’s employee did not qualify as a
government employee for Title VII, it stressed control-related factors in
doing so.61
Other jurisdictions have employed a “hybrid test” that focuses on the
common law factors while also taking into account the “economic reali-
Darden, but the Maynard court sought to determine the same type of common law
employment relationship. See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 219
n.8 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Maynard predates Darden, but it does not predate the common
law of agency.  Although Maynard concerned the West Virginia Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act, the Fourth Circuit applied the common law in finding that an em-
ployment relationship existed . . . .” (citing Maynard, 626 F.2d at 361–62)).
55. See Maynard, 626 F.2d at 360 (discussing worker’s claim against Kenova
Chemical Company).
56. See id. at 361–62 (affirming trial court’s decision).  The Fourth Circuit
applied the “loaned servant doctrine” of traditional agency law and found that
Maynard was a loaned servant of Kenova. See id.  The court reasoned that, “the
loaned servant doctrine provides that an employee directed or permitted to per-
form services for another ‘special’ employer may become that employer’s em-
ployee while performing those services.” See id. at 361 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227 (1958)).
57. See id. at 361–62 (recognizing joint-employer liability under loaned ser-
vant doctrine).
58. 807 F.3d 395 (1st Cir. 2015).
59. See id. at 398 (introducing background of case).
60. See id. at 404–05 (concluding no employment relationship existed).
61. See id. (applying control-related factors).
11
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ties” of the employment situation, asking whether an employee was eco-
nomically dependent on the temporary work assignment.62  However,
courts purporting to include an investigation of economic realities as a
component of their analysis have returned to the concept that “control
remains the principal guidepost for determining whether multiple entities
can be a plaintiff’s joint employers.”63
In short, other circuits considering Title VII liability for temporary
workers have both explicitly considered joint-employer liability in accor-
dance with EEOC guidance and emphasized control-related factors when
considering the existence of a common law employment relationship.64
Likewise, in Faush, the Third Circuit departed from its prior decisions by
recognizing joint-employer liability, emphasizing the sufficiency of con-
trol-related factors to defeat summary judgment and focusing on the prac-
tical reality of payment practices and hiring and firing procedures.65
62. See Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 406 (4th Cir. 2015)
(“We further conclude that the so-called ‘hybrid test,’ which considers both the
common law of agency and the economic realities of employment, is the correct
means to apply the joint employment doctrine . . .”); Callicutt v. Pepsi Bottling
Grp., Inc., No. CIV. 00-95DWFAJB, 2002 WL 992757, at *7 (D. Minn. May 13,
2002) (“Under the hybrid test, to determine whether an employee relationship
exists, all circumstances surrounding the relationship must be considered.” (citing
Wilde v. Cnty. of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1994))).  In Butler, a tempo-
rary worker at an automotive factory alleged sexual harassment in violation of Title
VII. See Butler, 793 F.3d at 406 (introducing facts of case).  The trial court granted
summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds that the worker was an em-
ployee of only the temporary staffing agency that assigned her, and the Fourth
Circuit reversed after applying the hybrid test. See id. (reversing and remanding to
trial court).  In Callicutt, several employees of a warehouse loading contract com-
pany alleged racial discrimination in violation of Title VII at a Pepsi facility. See
Callicutt, 2002 WL 992757, at *1 (introducing facts of case).  The trial court found
that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to survive summary judgment under
the hybrid test due to the strength of control-related factors in their favor. See id.
at *8 (applying hybrid test factors including skill required, source of equipment,
location of work, duration of employment relationship, whether employer assigns
additional projects, employee’s control over work schedule, method of payment,
employee’s role in hiring and paying assistants, whether work is part of regular
business of employer, whether employer is in business, how employee benefits are
conducted, and tax treatment of employee).  The court found that in finding that
“while many of the economic factors weigh against a finding that [plaintiffs] were
‘employees,’ all of the factors relating to the work environment—the common law
factors—weigh in favor, including Pepsi’s control over the manner and means of
work performance.” See id.
63. See Butler, 793 F.3d at 415; see also Callicutt, 2002 WL 992757, at *7 (“The
most important consideration, however, is whether the employer controls the
means and manner of the purported employee’s work.” (citing Schwieger v. Farm
Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 207 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2000))).
64. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Notice No. 915.002 (1997), 1997
WL 33159161, at *5–6; see also Butler, 793 F.3d at 406; Casey v. Dep’t Health and
Human Servs., 807 F.3d 395, 406 (1st Cir. 2015); Maynard v. Kenova Chem. Co.,
626 F.2d 359, 360 (4th Cir. 1980).
65. See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 214–17 (3d Cir. 2015)
(recognizing joint-employer liability under Title VII and noting heavy weight ac-
corded to control-related factors); Scott v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 523 F.
12
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III. FAUSH V. TUESDAY MORNING: THE THIRD CIRCUIT PUTS TITLE VII TO
WORK FOR TEMPORARY WORKERS?
Before Faush, an entire segment of the workforce was foreclosed from
protection from even the most egregious discriminatory workplace prac-
tices under Title VII, based on its inability to clear the threshold question
of employee status.  In Faush, the Third Circuit considered Faush’s allega-
tions that he and other African-American workers temporarily assigned to
a Tuesday Morning retail store were subjected to racial discrimination.66
The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant, holding
that Faush did not qualify as an employee, but the Third Circuit reversed
and remanded after applying Darden.67  The court recognized joint-em-
ployer liability and placed more emphasis on the control-related factors
and practical function than legal form in payment or hiring and firing
practices.68
A. Interview Questions: Factual Background in Faush
As an employee of Labor Ready, a staffing firm that provides tempo-
rary employees to clients, Faush was assigned to Tuesday Morning for a
period of ten days, during which “he generally worked for eight hours” per
day.69  Faush claimed the store manager subjected him and other African-
American workers to discriminatory treatment.70  Following these alleged
events, Faush brought suit against Tuesday Morning for, among other
things, a violation of Title VII, and Tuesday Morning filed a motion for
summary judgment.71
App’x 911, 912 (3d Cir. 2013) (failing to acknowledge possibility of joint-employer
relationship); Prather v. Prudential Fox & Roach, 326 F. App’x 670, 672–73 (3d
Cir. 2009) (omitting discussion of joint-employer relationship); Shah v. Bank of
Am., 346 F. App’x 831, 834 (3d Cir. 2009) (same); Fields v. Colgate Palmolive Co.,
Civil Action No. 10–365 (PGS), 2010 WL 5252537, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2010)
(omitting same).
66. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 210 (introducing Faush’s claims).
67. See id. at 215–20 (undertaking Darden analysis with emphasis on control-
related factors and practical impact of payment and concluding Faush survived
summary judgment).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 210 (noting Faush’s working arrangement with Tuesday
Morning).
70. See id. (describing facts underlying discrimination claim).  Specifically,
Faush alleged that the manager “accused him and [other African-American work-
ers] of stealing” store merchandise, that “the store owner’s mother told [Faush]
and two other African-American temporary employees to work in the back of the
store with the garbage,” and that “a white employee blocked their path and re-
ferred to them using a racial slur.” See id. (detailing allegedly discriminatory be-
havior).  Faush also alleged that the store manager told him that “[his] people
wouldn’t do that,” in reference to the alleged merchandise theft. See id. (internal
citation omitted).
71. See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d. 350, 352 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (describing Faush’s allegations), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded by 808
F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2015).  While Faush brought claims under both Title VII and the
13
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B. Job Requirements: Evidence at Summary Judgment
The trial court chose to apply the Darden test.72  Yet, the court mainly
focused on the formal procedures relating to compensation and hiring
and firing while largely omitting discussion of factors relating to day-to-day
control, and ignored the possibility of joint-employer liability after re-
jecting Faush’s argument in favor of the test from In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car
Wage & Employment Practices Litigation73 and ignoring the possibility of
joint-employer liability.74  As a result, it found Faush was not an employee
of Tuesday Morning.75
1. All About the Benjamins: Trial Court’s Analysis of Factors Relating to
Compensation
Faush worked at Tuesday Morning pursuant to an “Agreement to Sup-
ply Temporary Employees” (the Agreement).76  In its reasoning, the dis-
trict court accorded significant weight to the parties’ respective
responsibilities for paying temporary workers, noting that “Labor Ready
was solely responsible” in determining wages, social security, taxes, and
workers’ compensation insurance under the Agreement.77  The court also
noted that Tuesday Morning and Labor Ready are “separate and distinct
companies,” that “there is no record that Faush has ever applied for em-
ployment with Tuesday Morning,” and that Tuesday Morning and Faush
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the court noted that the statutes are “inter-
preted coextensively” with each other. See id. at 356 (quoting Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc.,
581 F.3d 175, 180 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009)).
72. See id. at 354–55 (rejecting Enterprise framework in favor of Darden analy-
sis).  In Enterprise, the Third Circuit limited its holding to the definition of “em-
ployer” under the FLSA. See In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp. Practices
Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2012) (describing factors courts should consider
“[w]hen faced with a question requiring examination of a potential joint employ-
ment relationship under the FLSA” (emphasis added)).
73. 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012).
74. See Faush, 995 F. Supp. 2d. at 355 (discussing compensation and other
aspects of employment).  The trial court did not note the possibility of a joint-
employment relationship, and instead applied the Darden test with the presupposi-
tion that either Tuesday Morning or Labor Ready was Faush’s employer. See id.
75. See id. at 356 (applying Darden test, finding balance of factors weighed in
favor of finding that Tuesday Morning was not employer, and granting summary
judgment to Tuesday Morning).
76. See id. at 352 (discussing staffing agreement between Tuesday Morning
and Labor Ready).  Faush and Tuesday Morning “never entered into any con-
tracts,” and Faush “never applied for employment with Tuesday Morning.” See id.
Under the agreement, “Tuesday Morning was expected to approve [the] time card
for each [temporary employee], or otherwise accurately report the daily hours
worked.” See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 210 (3d Cir. 2015)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Accordingly, at the
end of each day, [the store manager] signed a document indicating how many
hours each [Labor Ready] employee had worked.” Id. (discussing Tuesday Morn-
ing supervision of Labor Ready employees).
77. See Faush, 995 F. Supp. 2d. at 353 (discussing Labor Ready’s responsibili-
ties under Agreement).
14
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neither contracted with each other nor had any arrangement regarding
compensation.78  Moreover, the court noted, “Tuesday Morning never in-
tended to utilize any of the Labor Ready employees who worked at the
[s]tore as Tuesday Morning employees.”79
2. Pink Slip Blues: Trial Court Analysis of Factors Related to Hiring and
Firing
In reaching its conclusion, the trial court extensively discussed factors
relating to the procedures for recording hours, missing work, terminating
employment, and accessing the store.80  The court noted that Tuesday
Morning “never provided any Labor Ready workers . . . with a key to the
[s]tore . . . [and] Labor Ready provided gave a time card to all of its em-
ployees . . . which were returned to the Labor Ready office.”81  Labor
Ready would subsequently send an invoice to Tuesday Morning that in-
cluded the number of hours Labor Ready employees had worked in the
pay period, and the amount due based on a prearranged hourly fee.82
The trial court also noted that Faush “was not expected to contact any
Tuesday Morning employee if he was not able to report to work at the
[s]tore.”83  The trial court finally noted that only Labor Ready, and not
Tuesday Morning, “had the authority to terminate [Faush’s] employment
with Labor Ready,” and the store never received an unemployment bene-
fits claim from Faush.84
78. See id. at 352 (noting absence of employment application, wage or benefit
payments, or contract between Faush and Tuesday Morning).  The trial court
noted that Labor Ready was “solely responsible for payment of wages . . . required
taxes, social security,” as well as insurance for temporary employees. See id. at 353
(noting Labor Ready’s obligations under Agreement).
79. See id. at 353 (discussing Agreement).
80. See id. (discussing time card procedures and access to store keys for tem-
porary workers).  The district court cited Labor Ready’s provision of Faush’s time
card and invoice procedure as evidence that Faush was not Tuesday Morning’s
employee. See id. at 355.  While the court did not specifically note that Faush and
other temporary workers were not given keys to Labor Ready, court acknowledged
that the Terms and Conditions of the Agreement did not permit Tuesday Morning
to “entrust [Labor Ready’s temporary employees] ‘with the care of unattended
premises, custody or control of cash, credit cards, valuables or other similar prop-
erty.’” See id. at 355 (quoting Agreement).
81. See id. at 353 (discussing time card procedures and access to store keys for
temporary workers).
82. See id. (discussing procedure for Labor Ready invoicing of Tuesday
Morning).
83. Id. (stating Faush was not obligated to contact Tuesday Morning when
absent).
84. See id. (discussing Tuesday Morning’s inability to fire Faush from Labor
Ready and non-receipt of unemployment benefit claims from Faush).
15
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3. Are You My Employer? Trial Court’s Analysis of the Joint-Employer
Relationship
In addition, the trial court rejected Faush’s argument in favor of ap-
plying In re Enterprise, distinguishing In re Enterprise as considering the em-
ployment relationship only in the context of the FLSA.85  As a result, there
is nothing in the trial court’s opinion to suggest that the court considered
the possibility of a joint-employer relationship under Darden.86
C. The Third Circuit Takes the Job: Faush on Appeal
On appeal, the Third Circuit also undertook a Darden analysis.87
However, in reversing the trial court’s decision, the Third Circuit empha-
sized control-related factors and found joint-employer liability.88  The
85. See id. at 354 (rejecting Faush’s theory of joint-employer status).  The
Faush court noted that the definition of “employer” is “broadest” under the FLSA.
See id. at 355 (citing In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig.,
683 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2012)).
86. See id. (rejecting Faush’s theory of joint-employer status).  The court’s
opinion noted that Title VII’s definition of employer is “much narrower” than the
definition found in the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and FLSA, which means
cases construing Title VII are not persuasive sources of authority for interpreting
the FMLA or FLSA. See id. at 356 (quoting Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult
Prob. and Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 415 n.6 (3d Cir. 2012)). Compare Family Medical
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (2012) (defining employer as “any person
engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who em-
ploys 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calen-
dar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year”), and Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (defining employer as “any person acting di-
rectly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and
includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization (other than
when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of
such labor organization”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (defining “employer”
under Title VII and noting limitations).  The trial court further noted other Third
Circuit cases that applied Darden and found that the workers were employees of
the agency, not the worker’s temporary assignment. See Faush, 995 F. Supp. 2d at
356 (detailing application of Darden).  In its discussion, the trial court again re-
jected the possibility of joint-employer status, though it did not cite the test it used,
noting “Tuesday Morning did not have sufficient control over the terms and condi-
tions of plaintiff’s employment and did not share or co-determine those matters
with Labor Ready, to be considered a joint employer for purposes of Title VII, in
any event.” See id.
87. See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2015)
(rejecting Enterprise test in favor of Darden test).  The Third Circuit confirmed the
inapplicability of In re Enterprise, noting that “[a]s a doctrinal matter, however, it is
clear that the Darden test applies to Title VII cases, while the Enterprise test does
not.” See id. at 213 (declining to apply Enterprise test in Title VII case because defi-
nition of employee in Title VII and ERISA cases is understood to mean “conven-
tional master-servant relationship as understood by common law”).  The Darden
test was announced in an ERISA case, whereas the Enterprise test applied in FLSA
cases, where definition of employee construed more broadly. See id.
88. See id. at 214–16 (“[T]he inquiry under Darden is not which of two entities
should be considered the employer of the person in question . . . .” (citing Graves
v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1997))).  The court found that “Tuesday
16
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court also focused on the practical effects of payment and hiring and fir-
ing procedures, rather than their formal arrangements.89  While Tuesday
Morning could not terminate Faush’s employment with Labor Ready, it
could bar him from working at its store, and its payments to Labor Ready
were “functionally indistinguishable” from “direct” payments to temporary
workers.90  Significantly, the court extended the importance of temporary
workers performing the same tasks as full-time employees—a considera-
tion that falls most squarely under the control-related factor umbrella, as
dictating tasks to workers is indicia of control—to compensation-related
factors, as well.91
1. Money Isn’t Everything: Compensation in the Third Circuit’s Analysis
The Third Circuit began its analysis by finding that the district court
“overstated the extent to which the factors pertaining to compensation cut
against Faush.”92  It noted that while Labor Ready set the workers’ pay rate
and paid their taxes, wages, and worker’s compensation insurance, Tues-
day Morning was responsible for ensuring compliance with minimum and
“prevailing wage law[s],” and paying any required overtime.93  The court
determined Tuesday Morning was “in the best position to ensure compli-
ance with wage and hour laws because the temporary workers were simi-
larly situated to Tuesday Morning’s permanent employees.”94  Further,
the court found that Tuesday Morning’s payments to Labor Ready were
“functionally indistinguishable” from Tuesday Morning’s payments to em-
ployees.95  Though the relevant compensation-related facts are analogous
Morning’s control over the temporary employees’ daily activities overwhelmingly
favors Faush.” See id. at 216.
89. See id. at 216–17 (finding payments from Tuesday Morning to Faush were
“functionally indistinguishable from direct employee compensation” because
Tuesday Morning paid Labor Ready agreed-upon hourly rate for Faush’s services).
90. See id. at 216–17 (analyzing compensation and hiring- and firing-related
factors in terms of practical effect rather than formal structure).
91. See id. at 215–16 (linking overlap of temporary and permanent workers’
duties with finding that compensation-related factors weigh less strongly in favor of
Tuesday Morning than trial court had found).
92. See id. at 215.
93. See id. at 212 (stating Agreement did not relieve Tuesday Morning of “its
primary responsibility for ensuring complete and accurate compliance with all lo-
cal, state, and federal laws relating to prevailing wages”).
94. See id. at 215 (discussing ability of Tuesday Morning to ensure
compliance).
95. See id. at 215–16 (analyzing payments to Labor Ready).  The court distin-
guished Tuesday Morning’s practice of paying an agreed-upon hourly rate for each
hour worked by a temporary employee to Labor Ready, who then paid its employ-
ees from payment procedures typically used to compensate independent contrac-
tors, which include paying “a fixed rate for completion of a discrete project.” See
id. at 216 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752
(1989)).  The court noted that Tuesday Morning “was even obligated under the
[a]greement to pay any overtime charges required by law[,]” ultimately character-
izing the arrangement as one where “[e]ssentially, Tuesday Morning indirectly
paid the temporary employees’ wages, plus a fee to Labor Ready for its administra-
17
O'Halloran: Does Title VII Work for Temps? Faush v. Tuesday Morning Reconside
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
670 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 653
to those in cases where the Third Circuit had previously found no employ-
ment relationship under Darden, the Faush court focused on practical
function over legal form in finding that Tuesday Morning “essentially,”
albeit “indirectly,” paid Labor Ready employees’ salaries.96
2. Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Third Circuit’s Analysis of Hiring and
Firing
The court found that hiring and firing factors favored Tuesday Morn-
ing only slightly.97  The court noted “Tuesday Morning obviously did not
have the power to terminate Faush’s employment with Labor Ready or any
obligation to pay him unemployment benefits . . . . [but] did, however,
have ultimate control over whether Faush was permitted to work at its
store.”98  Further, the court concluded the record did not reflect any obli-
gation on Labor Ready’s part to pay Faush when not assigned to a work-
place or provide him an “immediate alternative assignment.”99  In light of
this reasoning, the court concluded the hiring and firing factors sup-
ported Tuesday Morning to a lesser degree than the district court had
found.100
The Third Circuit emphasized practical function over legal form with
respect to compensation-related factors, noting that, while “Tuesday
Morning obviously did not have the power to terminate Faush’s employ-
ment with Labor Ready or any obligation to pay him unemployment bene-
fits[,] Tuesday Morning did, however, have ultimate control over whether
Faush was permitted to work at its store.”101  When faced with analogous
facts in the past, the Third Circuit gave significant weight to temporary
tive services.” See id.  Conceptually, the court separated Tuesday Morning’s “indi-
rect” payments to temporary workers from the “administrative services” payments
to Labor Ready. See id.
96. See id. at 215–16 (holding payment per hour made from temporary as-
signed employer to employment agency represents functional equivalent of di-
rectly paying temporary workers); but see Prather v. Prudential Fox & Roach, 326 F.
App’x 670, 672–73 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding compensation factors weighed
against plaintiff); Shah v. Bank of Am., 346 F. App’x 831, 834 (3d Cir. 2009) (con-
cluding same).
97. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 216 (stating factors related to “hiring and firing
provide only weak support for Tuesday Morning’s position”).
98. See id. (“If Tuesday Morning was unhappy with any temporary employee
for any reason, it had the power to demand a replacement from Labor Ready and
to prevent the ejected employee from returning to the store.”).
99. See id. (discussing factors related to hiring and firing).
100. See id. (discussing factors related to hiring and firing).  As Faush was the
non-moving party, under the applicable summary judgment standard, the court
inferred all facts in his favor. See id. Compare Faush, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 353 (finding
hiring and firing factors weighed against Faush), with Faush, 808 F.3d at 216 (find-
ing hiring and firing factors did not weigh heavily in either direction).
101. See id. (reasoning Tuesday Morning had ability to decide whether Faush
could work in its store).
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employers’ inability to terminate a worker’s employment with a staffing
firm.102
3. Working for the Man: Third Circuit’s Analysis of Daily Control Factors
Finally, the court found the factors relating to the daily control of
temporary workers “overwhelmingly favor[ed] Faush.”103  Specifically,
Tuesday Morning recorded hours worked, assigned work, oversaw assign-
ments, and “furnished any equipment and materials necessary.”104  Nota-
bly, Tuesday Morning contracted for the Labor Ready employees only as a
“stop[gap] measure” until it could hire more full-time employees.105
Supervision by Labor Ready was minimal once a worker was present at
his or her assigned worksite, with the court noting that “on the rare occa-
sions that a Labor Ready supervisor visited the Tuesday Morning store,”
the supervisor simply relayed information from Tuesday Morning’s man-
agement to the temporary workers.106  In previous cases considering tem-
porary workers’ eligibility for Title VII protection, Third Circuit courts had
102. See Scott v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 523 F. App’x 911, 912 (3d Cir.
2013) (finding fact that staffing service set compensation and was responsible for
hiring and firing weighed against plaintiff); Prather v. Prudential Fox & Roach,
326 F. App’x 670, 672–73 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating fact that plaintiff received
paycheck directly from staffing service and temporary assigned employer did not
have power to terminate plaintiff’s relationship with staffing service weighed
against plaintiff); Shah v. Bank of Am., 346 F. App’x 831, 834 (3d Cir. 2009) (find-
ing fact that staffing service set plaintiff’s “rate of pay” and that temporary assigned
employer “contacted [staffing agency] before terminating [plaintiff’s] employ-
ment” weighed against plaintiff).
103. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 216 (noting Tuesday Morning’s control over tem-
porary workers’ tasks such as “unloading and stocking merchandise, setting up
display shelves, and removing garbage” favored Faush).
104. See id. (discussing factors relating to daily control).  The court noted
that, while Tuesday Morning had no input on which Labor Ready employees ar-
rived at the store on any given day, when an employee was present, he or she
received “assignments, direct[ ] supervis[ion] . . . site-specific training, [ ] any
equipment and materials necessary” from Tuesday Morning personnel, and Tues-
day Morning employees were responsible for verifying the hours worked by each
Labor Ready worker on a daily basis.  The court explained that such an arrange-
ment more closely resembles a “traditional” employment relationship than one of
an independent contractor. See id.
105. See id. at 217 (alteration in original) (discussing Labor Ready’s reason for
hiring temporary workers).  The court further pointed out that “the Labor Ready
employees, under the direct supervision of Tuesday Morning management, per-
formed only unskilled tasks . . . .” Id.  In fact, the Third Circuit noted that “[w]hile
it is true that the [a]greement precluded Tuesday Morning from entrusting any
temporary employee with unattended premises, valuables, machinery, or vehicles,
the tasks assigned to the Labor Ready employees . . . were no different than those
assigned to Tuesday Morning employees.” See id. (discussing similarity of work per-
formed by temporary and permanent employees).
106. See id. at 218 (discussing extent of Labor Ready’s supervision of employ-
ees assigned to Tuesday Morning).
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omitted any extensive discussion of analogous facts relating to day-to-day
control.107
4. Two Employers Are Better Than One: Third Circuit’s Analysis of Joint-
Employer Liability
The court pointed out that two employers could qualify as “co-em-
ployers or joint employers” under Darden, noting that, “[s]ignificantly, the
inquiry under Darden is not which of the two entities should be considered
the employer of the person in question.”108  Accordingly, in a departure
from previous cases, the court in Faush explicitly accepted the proposition
that it need not find one or the other entity to be the sole employer.109
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: TEMPORARY WORKERS GET A BREAK UNDER FAUSH
The Third Circuit’s decision in Faush entails two main developments
related to temporary workers and Title VII.110  First, the court’s explicit
recognition of joint-employer liability for temporary workers’ Title VII
107. See Scott v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 523 F. App’x 911, 912 (3d Cir.
2013) (omitting discussion of day-to-day supervision and control in favor of formal
hiring and firing and payment procedures); Prather v. Prudential Fox & Roach,
326 F. App’x 670, 672 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that formal hiring and firing and
payment procedures supported summary judgment for defendant without exten-
sive consideration of day-to-day supervision and control factors when temporary
administrative aide was paid and terminated by staffing service); Shah v. Bank of
Am., 346 F. App’x 831, 834 (3d Cir. 2009) (omitting extensive discussion of day-to-
day supervision and control factors in finding that hiring and firing factors and
payment procedures weighed against plaintiff).  In Shah, the temporary employer
consulted the staffing agency prior to terminating the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
had been paid by the staffing agency. See id.
108. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 215 (citing Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 727 (3d
Cir. 1997)) (recognizing joint-employer concept under Title VII).  In Graves, for-
mer state judicial clerks brought a Title VII claim for sex discrimination against the
county in which they worked. See Graves, 117 F.3d at 723.  The district court dis-
missed the action, finding that because the clerks were officially employees of the
judicial branch of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, they could not also be
county employees. See id. at 724.  The Third Circuit reversed the district court,
finding that although the state judicial branch had “the inherent right to hire,
discharge, and supervise clerks . . . it may also have the derivative right to delegate
employer-type responsibilities to a county,” and thus create a “de facto” employ-
ment relationship. See id. at 727, 729.  The Third Circuit also previously consid-
ered potential joint-employer liability under Title VII through analysis of the
hiring and firing, payment, and daily control factors under Darden, considering:
“(1) the entity’s authority to hire and fire employees, promulgate work rules and
assignments, and set conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits,
and hours; (2) its day-to-day supervision of employees, including employee disci-
pline; and (3) its control of employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes
and the like.” See Plaso v. IJKG, LLC, 553 F. App’x 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2014) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
109. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 213–14 (discussing possibility of joint-employer
status).
110. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis in Faush, see supra notes
82–109 and accompanying text.
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claims broadens the universe of potential Title VII plaintiffs.111  Second,
the Third Circuit has made it more likely that temporary-worker plaintiffs
will survive summary judgment by emphasizing the significance of control-
related factors and focusing on the practical implications of hiring and
firing and compensation factors in the Darden inquiry.112  Finally, while
these holdings may represent a new direction for the Third Circuit—espe-
111. For an analysis of the Third Circuit’s treatment of the joint-employer
concept in Faush, see supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.  The Third Cir-
cuit’s recognition of joint-employer status is a significant change for both tempo-
rary employees and the employers who enlist them. See Development in the Law,
Temporary Employment and the Imbalance of Power, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1647, 1658
(1996) (noting difficulty temporary employees experience in obtaining Title VII
protection despite language of statute that appears to cover temporary employ-
ees); Points to Remember, 37 No. 2 QUINLAN, EMP. TERMINATIONS L. BULL. NL 6
(2016) (noting that Labor Ready did not anticipate potential Title VII liability and
“importance of recognizing the blurred lines that may surface concerning workers
you retain through a temporary staffing agency”); Robert H. Bernstein & Michael
J. Slocum, Third Circuit Espouses Fact-Sensitive Inquiries in Considering Joint-Employer
Liability and Compensation for Meal Periods: What Employers Can Do to Brighten the Lines,
GREENBERG TRAURIG (Dec. 2015), http://www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/Publica-
tions/Alerts/190405/Third-Circuit-Espouses-Fact-Sensitive-Inquiries-in-Consider-
ing-Joint-Employer-Liability-and-Compensation-for-Meal-Periods-What-Employers-
Can-Do-to-Brighten-the-Lines [https://perma.cc/9ME9-Z5PK] (noting that “the
Third Circuit has now made it more likely that [temporary employers] will also be
subject to Title VII”).  An employer that uses temporary workers should keep the
following steps in mind:
First, wherever possible, identify the full panoply of factors that a court is
likely to consider in evaluating a particular issue.  Bear in mind that
courts typically decline to articulate exhaustive lists.  Nonetheless, those
factors which the courts cite are likely to be central, even if not necessa-
rily dispositive.  Second, determine the ideal set of “ground rules” that
must exist in your workplaces to meet the applicable factors.  In other
words, envision what you would want your summary judgment fact state-
ment to say.  Finally—and most importantly, as ultimately it will be the
actual facts in existence which control—ensure that the realities of your
workplace meet those “ground rules” to the greatest extent possible.
Id.
112. For an analysis of the Faush court’s treatment of the relative importance
of control-related factors as compared to hiring and firing- and compensation-re-
lated factors, see supra notes 86–107 and accompanying text. See also Joel
Kreizman, How Will Faush v. Tuesday Morning Impact New Jersey Employers?, SCARINI
HOLLENBECK (Dec. 1, 2015), http://scarincihollenbeck.com/temporary-worker-
can-bring-bias-suit/ [https://perma.cc/C79W-PP6M] (“The decision in Faush v.
Tuesday Morning will not impact all temp workers, but could result in liability in
cases where the employer exerts a certain degree of control over the day-to-day
activities of the employee.”); Philip J. Morin III & Veronica P. Hallett, Employment/
HR Alert: Court Expands Potential Liability of Employers for Discrimination Claims by Tem-
porary Workers from Staffing Agencies, FLORIO PERRUCCI STEINHARDT & FADER BLOG
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://www2.fpsflawfirm.com/court_expands_potential_liability_of
_employers_for_discrimination_claims_by_temporary_workers_from_staffing_age
ncies [https://perma.cc/BY24-DWZE] (“[C]ompanies that use temporary workers
will likely be considered joint employers . . . under federal and state anti-discrimi-
nation laws . . . . the Faush opinion could significantly increase exposure for dis-
crimination claims for employers who do business in the states within the Third
Circuit . . . .”).
21
O'Halloran: Does Title VII Work for Temps? Faush v. Tuesday Morning Reconside
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
674 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 653
cially in light of Prather, Shah, and Scott—they reflect the weight of author-
ity from other jurisdictions and official guidance.113
A. Joint Employer Liability Opens the Office Door to Temporary Workers
Before the court’s holding in Faush, Third Circuit cases determining
the existence of an employment relationship showed no indication that
the court considered the possibility of joint-employer status.114  Rather,
the analyses in those cases proceeded from the premise that the individual
had an employment relationship with either the temporary staffing agency
or the temporary assigned placement employer.115  In Faush, the Third
Circuit explicitly noted the possibility of a joint-employer relationship de-
spite rejecting the plaintiff’s preferred joint-employer test.116
In fact, the relevant considerations in determining joint-employer sta-
tus are virtually identical to the Darden factors.117  By providing a prece-
dential opinion regarding the proper analysis of the employment
relationship for temporary workers under Title VII and specifically ac-
knowledging the existence of a joint-employer test that is essentially coex-
113. For analysis of Prather, Shah, and Scott, see supra notes 36–45 and accom-
panying text.  For analysis of other jurisdiction’s cases determining the existence of
an employment relationship between a temporary worker and a temporary as-
signed employer, as well as EEOC guidance on this issue, see Butler v. Drive Auto.
Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 406 (4th Cir. 2015); Maynard v. Kenova Chem. Co.,
626 F.2d 359, 360 (4th Cir. 1980); U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Notice
No. 915.002 (1997), 1997 WL 33159161, at *5–6; supra notes 49–63 and accompa-
nying text.
114. See Scott v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 523 F. App’x 911, 912 (3d Cir.
2013) (finding temporary administrative assistant not employee for purposes of
Title VII); Shah v. Bank of Am., 346 F. App’x 831, 833 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding
temporary bank worker not employee for purposes of Title VII); Fields v. Colgate
Palmolive Co., Civil Action No. 10–365 (PGS), 2010 WL 5252537, *4 (D.N.J. Dec.
15, 2010) (finding temporary chemist not employee for purposes of Title VII).
115. See Scott, 523 F. App’x at 912 (failing to acknowledge possibility of joint-
employer relationship); Prather v. Prudential Fox & Roach, 326 F. App’x 670,
672–73 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding no employment relationship between temporary
administrative aide and temporary assigned employer without reference to possi-
bility of joint-employer relationship); Shah, 346 F. App’x at 834 (finding temporary
bank teller not employee of bank without discussion of potential joint-employer
relationship); Fields, 2010 WL 5252537, at *4 (finding temporary chemist not em-
ployee of temporary assigned employer without discussion of potential joint-em-
ployer relationship).
116. See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, 808 F.3d 208, 213–15 (3d Cir. 2015) (re-
jecting Enterprise test but noting loaned servant doctrine and Graves finding of
joint-employment under Title VII).  The court specifically acknowledged that
Graves contemplated a joint-employer relationship under Title VII, despite the lack
of a citation to that case in Faush’s brief. See id.
117. See Plaso v. IJKG, LLC, 553 F. App’x 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding no
joint-employment relationship when consulting firm employee brought Title VII
claim); see also Faush, 808 F.3d at 214 (quoting Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved
Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2013)) (noting court’s focus on
“which entity paid [the employees’] salary, hired and fired them, and had control
over their daily employment activities” (alteration in original)).
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss4/2
2016] CASEBRIEF 675
tensive with the most relevant Darden factors, the Third Circuit’s opinion
in Faush contemplates broader employer liability than previous opin-
ions.118  This result is consistent with the broad remedial purpose of Title
VII and liberal construction applied by courts.119  Further, this liberal con-
struction of Title VII is especially appropriate, given the Supreme Court’s
characterization of Title VII as “central to the federal policy of prohibiting
wrongful discrimination in the [n]ation’s workplaces and in all sectors of
economic endeavor.”120
118. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 209 (concluding reasonable jury could find exis-
tence of employment relationship under facts presented if it considers possibility
of joint employment); but see Scott, 523 F. App’x at 912 (omitting discussion of
possibility of joint-employer relationship); Prather, 326 F. App’x at 672–73 (omit-
ting discussion of joint-employer relationship); Shah, 346 F. App’x at 834 (omitting
discussion of joint-employer relationship).  The Faush opinion anticipates this ex-
pansion of liability, noting, “[w]e are mindful that many aspects of the Labor
Ready–Tuesday Morning employment arrangement that we have identified . . . will
pertain to a large number of temporary employment arrangements, with attendant
potential liability under Title VII for the clients of those temporary employment
agencies.” See Faush, 808 F.3d at 218.
119. See Stuart J. Ishimaru, Fulfilling the Promise of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 25, 40 (2005) (arguing for expanded and dynamic
application of Title VII); Meyer & Marshall, supra note 9 (noting that remedial
nature of Title VII supports expansion of protections to temporary workers in
some cases).  The significance of Title VII’s protections was not lost on contempo-
rary observers, as one 1966 account of Title VII’s legislative history exulted that
Congress “brought to fruition the labors and aspirations of civil rights proponents
everywhere[ ] [and] made possible that which has never before been possible in
America and will leave a lasting mark on the structure of American society.” See
Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. REV. 431, 457 (1966).  Vaas
evinces a clear appreciation for Title VII’s historical significance in a near-contem-
poraneous account of its legislative history, noting, “[t]he significance of what
Congress has done and the extent of its labors cannot be overstated.” See id.  Com-
menters were not alone in the view that Title VII was intended to remedy historical
racial injustice broadly; before signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, President Lyn-
don Johnson remarked,
We believe that all men are entitled to the blessings of liberty.  Yet mil-
lions of men are being deprived of those blessings—not because of their
own failures, but because of the color of their skin . . . .But it cannot
continue.  Our Constitution, the foundation of our Republic, forbids it.
The principles of our freedom forbid it.  Morality forbids it.  And the law
I will sign tonight forbids it.
Jacqueline A. Berrien, Statement on the 50th Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
EEOC (July 2, 2014), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/cra50th/ [https://
perma.cc/K2W5-KEKN] (quoting President Lyndon B. Johnson on Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
120. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522 (2013)
(describing Title VII).
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B. A Model Employee: Third Circuit’s Analysis Brings It into Line
with Other Jurisdictions
The Third Circuit’s decision in Faush reflects the weight of authority
both in other circuits and official EEOC guidance.121  In keeping with the
policy of liberal interpretation, the reasoning in Faush corresponds with
the Fourth Circuit’s determination that an employment relationship exists
between a temporary worker and an assigned placement, as well as the
First Circuit’s focus on control-related factors.122  Moreover, while the hy-
brid test applied by some circuits appears to contradict the Darden inquiry,
its application leans heavily on common law control factors and thus rec-
ognizes their importance in examining the worker’s “economic
realities.”123
Although Maynard was decided before Darden, its discussion of the
loaned servant doctrine comports with the court’s joint-employer analysis
in Faush.124  Moreover, EEOC guidance clearly contemplates Title VII lia-
bility for an employer when that “employer exercises significant supervi-
sory control over the [temporary] worker.”125
121. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 210; Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d
404, 406 (4th Cir. 2015); Maynard v. Kenova Chem. Co., 626 F.2d 359, 360 (4th
Cir. 1980); U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Notice No. 915.002 (1997),
1997 WL 33159161, at *5–6.  The Faush court distinguished the First Circuit’s deci-
sion in Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecuarias de Puerto Rico, 929 F.2d 814 (1st
Cir. 1991), on the grounds that, while the court did examine the possible existence
of a joint-employer relationship under a control-based analysis, the degree of con-
trol was such that “under [those] circumstances, it is unsurprising that the First
Circuit held that the grain mill operator was not the laborer’s employer.” See
Faush, 808 F.3d at 219 n.10 (distinguishing Rivas).  Notably, the Faush court held
only that summary judgment should not have been granted, while the Fourth Cir-
cuit found that an employment relationship existed as a matter of law in both
cases. Compare Faush, 808 F.3d at 210, with Butler, 793 F.3d at 406, and Maynard,
626 F.2d at 360.
122. See Butler, 793 F.3d at 406 (finding employment relationship between
temporary employee and assigned placement under hybrid test); Maynard, 626
F.2d at 360 (finding employment relationship between temporary worker and as-
signed placement under loaned servant theory); Rivas, 929 F.2d at 819–22 (analyz-
ing joint-employer relationship for temporary employee by considering control
factors).
123. See Butler, 793 F.3d at 414–15 (explaining centrality of control-related
factors in hybrid test); Callicutt, 2002 WL 992757, at *7–8 (explaining centrality of
control-related factors in hybrid test).
124. Compare Maynard, 626 F.2d at 361–62 (examining loaned servant doc-
trine’s applicability to temporary worker assignment), with Faush, 808 F.3d at 215
(examining whether temporary worker assignment created joint-employer
relationship).
125. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Notice No. 915.002 (1997),
1997 WL 33159161, at *5–6 (“A client of a temporary employment agency typically
qualifies as an employer of the temporary worker during the job assignment, along
with the agency.  This is because the client usually exercises significant supervisory
control over the worker.”).
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss4/2
2016] CASEBRIEF 677
C. Daily Control, Payment Practices, and Hiring and Firing As a Practical
Matter: Temporary Workers Get a Raise over the
Summary Judgment Bar
The Faush court found that control-related factors could be sufficient
to allow the worker to survive summary judgment.126  The court’s corre-
sponding emphasis on the practical implications of hiring, firing, and
compensation reinforces this shift toward expanding Title VII protection
to temporary workers.127  While Third Circuit courts have found in the
past that hiring, firing, and compensation considerations were sufficient
to grant summary judgment on a finding of no employment relationship,
the Faush decision will properly compel examination of all factors from a
practical perspective.128
V. ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS: HOW TO KEEP YOUR JOB AFTER FAUSH
The Third Circuit’s decision in Faush both explicitly recognizes joint-
employer liability and suggests that more temporary workers subject to
day-to-day direction by assigned-placement supervisors may survive sum-
126. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 215–17 (finding district court overstated extent to
which certain factors weighed against plaintiff and control-related others favored
plaintiff).  As the Court summarized its holding, “[a]lthough [Faush] was paid and
dispatched by Labor Ready, he worked under the direct supervision and control of
Tuesday Morning managers who instructed the Labor Ready employees on the
‘details of the work they were doing.’” See id. at 218 (quoting Williamson v. Con-
sol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352 (3d Cir. 1991)).  The court’s language indi-
cates that control-related factors alone may be enough to preclude summary
judgment hinging on the existence of an employment relationship. See id. (“Tues-
day Morning’s extensive control over Faush’s activities could suffice to make him a
common-law servant even though Labor Ready paid him and had the ultimate
power to fire him.”).
127. See id. at 215–17 (analyzing hiring, firing, and compensation according
to practical effect rather than official procedure).  The court found that Tuesday
Morning actions, in providing site-specific training and necessary equipment and
materials, and directly supervising and assigning tasks to Labor Ready workers
more closely resembled those of a traditional employer than an entity hiring an
independent contractor. See id. at 216–17 (noting control-related factors support-
ing employment relationship); see also Kreizman, supra note 112 (“The decision in
Faush v. Tuesday Morning will not impact all temp workers, but could result in liabil-
ity in cases where the employer exerts a certain degree of control over the day-to-
day activities of the employee.”); Morin III & Hallett, supra note 112
(“[C]ompanies that use temporary workers will likely be considered joint employ-
ers . . . under federal and state anti-discrimination laws.  Thus, the Faush opinion
could significantly increase exposure for discrimination claims for employers who
do business in the states within the Third Circuit . . . .”).
128. See Scott v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 523 F. App’x 911, 912 (3d Cir.
2013) (concluding compensation and hiring- and firing-related factors weighed
against plaintiff); Prather v. Prudential Fox & Roach, 326 F. App’x 670, 672 (3d
Cir. 2009) (concluding same); Shah v. Bank of Am., 346 F. App’x 831, 833 (3d Cir.
2009) (concluding same); Bernstein & Slocum, supra note 111 (discussing Darden
factors employed by court to determine employee status and stressing fact-specific
nature of proper inquiry as described in Faush).
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mary judgment as to the existence of an employment relationship.129  Fol-
lowing Faush, employers’ attorneys should attack control-related factors
weighing against an employer and emphasize any payment practices that
resemble those of a contracting relationship, while employees’ attorneys’
should focus on assigned placement supervisors’ day-to-day control and
the practical effects of their hiring, firing, and compensation
procedures.130
A. Hands-Off Management: Employers’ Attorneys Should Work to Attack
Factors Relating to Control and Emphasize Any Payment Practices
Suggestive of Contractor Relationship
Faush represents a potential expansion of employer liability.131  Ac-
cordingly, employers’ attorneys should attack both the factors relating to
possible joint-employer liability, as well as the Darden factors relating to
control over an employee.132  The grounds on which to attack these issues
overlap, as the criteria relevant to both include the entity’s ability to assign
tasks, supervise day-to-day employee activities, and oversee employee
records.133  Courts may find these arguments more persuasive when the
temporary worker is performing tasks that require more specialized skills,
rather than unskilled tasks directed by the temporary assigned em-
ployer.134  Likewise, employers’ attorneys should emphasize practical as-
pects of payment procedures that suggest a contractor relationship—
wherein an employee is paid “a fixed rate for the completion of a discrete
project”—rather than a traditional employment relationship where an em-
129. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 215–17 (recognizing joint-employer liability while
examining Faush’s relationship to Tuesday Morning).
130. For advice for employers’ attorneys, see infra notes 135–39 and accompa-
nying text.  For advice for temporary workers’ attorneys, see infra notes 140–45 and
accompanying text.
131. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 215–17 (recognizing joint-employer liability);
Kathleen M. Connelly, Third Circuit Adopts Narrower Darden Test to Determine Joint
Employer Status for Purposes of Title VII, LINDABURY, MCCORMICK, ESTABROOK &
COOPER, P.C. (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.lindabury.com/firm/articles-resources/
narrower-darden-test-joint-employer-status-title-vii.html [https://perma.cc/52AK-
D369] (“Despite efforts by employers to doge an employer–employee relationship,
the courts are increasingly scrutinizing these relationships and finding that both
the temporary staffing agency and the employer it is staffing are on the hook for
compliance with a wide range of labor and employment laws.”).
132. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 215–17 (recognizing joint-employer liability and
control-related factors).  Evidence that temporary employees received direction
from their assigning agency or were directly supervised by the assigning agency
would weigh against a finding of joint-employer liability. See id.
133. See e.g., Plaso v. IJKG, LLC, 553 F. App’x 199, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2014)
(citing Covington v. Int’l Assoc. of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 119
(3d Cir. 2013) (reciting factors relevant to joint-employer inquiry)).
134. See e.g., Faush, 808 F.3d at 217 (“[T]he tasks assigned to the Labor Ready
employees, according to the testimony of a Tuesday Morning manager, were no
different than those assigned to Tuesday Morning employees.”); see also Points to
Remember, supra note 111 (noting frequently “blurred lines” between work of full-
time employees and temporary workers).
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ployee is paid a set hourly rate, either by the temporary assigned employer
or the staffing agency.135
B. Works Well with Others: Temporary Workers’ Attorneys Should Emphasize
Control Factors and Payment Procedures Indicative of Traditional
Employment Relationship
Attorneys representing temporary workers will find significant sup-
port for their clients’ position in Faush.136  Specifically, employees’ attor-
neys should emphasize temporary assigned employers’ day-to-day control
over their clients.137  As previously noted, these factors overlap with factors
that tend to prove the existence of a joint-employment relationship and
may kill two birds of burden with one evidentiary stone.138  Employees’
attorneys may find these arguments more availing when representing cli-
ents who performed low or unskilled labor at their temporary assigned
work assignment.139
Employees’ attorneys should also seek to analogize payment practices
during a temporary work assignment to those of a traditional employment
relationship and stress the lack of functional difference between whether
the assigned employer or staffing agency pays the temporary worker.140
Similarly, employees’ attorneys should stress that the staffing agency has a
responsibility to provide a new work assignment to a client upon
termination.141
135. See id. at 215–16 (discussing difference in payment procedure between
independent contractors and employees).
136. See id. at 220 (reversing trial court’s entry of summary judgment on
Faush’s Title VII and PHRA claims); Bernstein & Slocum, supra note 111 (“[T]he
Third Circuit has now made it more likely that they will also be subject to Title VII
in relation to temporary workers . . . .”); Connelly, supra note 131 (stating “courts
are increasingly scrutinizing these relationships and finding that both the tempo-
rary staffing agency and the employer it is staffing are on the hook for
compliance”).
137. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 216–17 (emphasizing control-related factors).
138. See id. (discussing control-related factors); see also Plaso, 553 F. App’x at
204 (citing Covington, 710 F.3d at 119) (listing considerations in determining joint-
employer status); Bernstein & Slocum, supra note 111 (listing factors of which em-
ployers need to be aware when employing temporary workers).
139. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 217 (noting Faush performed unskilled tasks that
full-time employees otherwise would have performed).
140. See id. at 215–16 (finding payment of fixed hourly rate to staffing com-
pany was effectively “direct employee compensation”); see also Points to Remember,
supra note 111 (noting payment process in Faush was important factor in court’s
holding).
141. See Faush, 808 F.3d at 216 (noting lack of evidence that Tuesday Morning
had obligation to provide Faush with new work assignment upon termination); see
also Points to Remember, supra note 111 (stating Labor Ready employed Faush when
he was not working for Tuesday Morning).
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VI. CONCLUSION
By recognizing joint-employer liability, focusing on control-related
factors, payment procedures, and hiring and firing authority from a practi-
cal perspective, the Third Circuit’s decision in Faush will allow more tem-
porary workers to survive summary judgment on Title VII claims.142  While
the court’s decision will expand employer liability, it comports with the
weight of authority from other circuits and EEOC guidance and accurately
reflects the broad remedial policy considerations underlying Title VII.143
142. For a discussion of the joint-employer liability analysis in Faush, see supra
notes 86–109 and accompanying text.
143. For a discussion of other circuits’ and the EEOC’s treatment of the issue,
see supra notes 49–64 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the remedial
policy considerations underlying Title VII, see supra notes 26–28 and accompany-
ing text.
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